The group generated by the round functions of a block cipher has been widely investigated. We identify a large class of block ciphers for which this group is easily guaranteed to be primitive. Our class includes the AES cipher and the SERPENT cipher.
For a given cipher, it is an interesting problem to determine the permutation group generated by its round functions (with the key varying in the key space), since this group might reveal weaknesses of the cipher. However, these results usually require an ad-hoc proof (with a notable recent exception [19] ).
In this paper, we consider a class of block ciphers, large enough to contain some well-known ciphers (like the AES cipher and the SERPENT cipher [2] ), which is such that the primitivity of the related group can be easily established by only checking some properties of its S-Boxes. Our results may be useful to cipher designers wanting to avert group imprimitivity, since in our context they would do it easily.
Preliminaries

Group theory and finite field theory
Let G be a finite group acting transitively on a set V and H ≤ G a subgroup. We write the action of an element g ∈ G on an element α ∈ V as αg. Also, αG = { αg : g ∈ G } is the orbit of α and G α = { g ∈ G : αg = α } is its stabilizer. A partition B of V is G-invariant if for any B ∈ B and g ∈ G, one has Bg ∈ B. The partition B is trivial if B = { V } or B = { { α } : α ∈ V }. If B is non-trivial then it is a block system for the action of G on V (and any B ∈ B is a block). If such a block system exists, then we say that G is imprimitive in its action on V (equivalently, G acts imprimitively on V ). If G is not imprimitive (and it is transitive), then we say that it is primitive. Since G acts transitively on V , we have then B = { Bg : g ∈ G }.
Lemma 2.1 ([3], Theorem 1.7). Let G be a finite group, acting transitively on a set V . Let α ∈ V . Then the blocks B containing α are in one-to-one correspondence with the subgroups H such that G α < H < G. The correspondence is given by B = α H. In particular, G is primitive if and only if G α is a maximal subgroup of G.
We denote by Sym(V ) and Alt(V ), respectively, the symmetric and alternating group on V . When V is a vector space over a finite field F q with q elements, we also denote by T(V ) the translation group
It is well-known that T(V ) is a transitive subgroup of Sym(V ), which is imprimitive except for the trivial case V = F p , with p a prime. Any block system B of T(V ) is the set of translates of a proper vector subspace W of V , that is, B = {W + v | v ∈ V }. We denote by AGL(V ) the group of all affine permutations of V , which is a primitive maximal subgroup of Sym(V ), and by GL(V ) the group of all linear permutations of V , which is a subgroup of AGL(V ).
We will need a special case of the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2 [7, 13] 
The smallest such δ is called the differential uniformity of F. Note that δ ≥ 2 for any vBf. Differentially 2-uniform mappings are called almost perfect nonlinear, or APN for short. If we denote byF a the vBf which maps
for any a and b)
. From now on, we shorten "differential uniformity" to "uniformity". Vectorial Boolean functions used as S-boxes in block ciphers must have low uniformity to prevent differential cryptanalysis (see [1, 16] ). In this sense, APN functions are optimal. However, numerous experiments suggest the following conjecture If m is even, no APN function is a permutation.
In some practical situations it may be desirable to use permutations as S-Boxes (however this is not the case for classical Feistel ciphers, such as the DES [14] ), possibly APN functions. In these cases, implementation issues suggest the use of an even m. If the previous conjecture is true, this is impossible. In fact, the permutations commonly used as S-Boxes are either APN with m odd (as in the KASUMI cipher [6] ) or non-APN with m even (as in the AES cipher).
Any vBf can also be regarded as a polynomial in F 2 m [x] (with degree at most 2 m −1) [12] . When m is even, the patched inverse function x 2 m −2 is a 4-uniform permutation [16] and was chosen as the basic S-box, with m = 8, in the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [5] .
Previous results on the group generated by the round functions
Let C be any block cipher such that the plain-text space M coincides with the cipher space. Let K be the key space. Any key k ∈ K induces a permutation τ k on M. Since M is usually V = (F 2 ) n for some n ∈ N, we can consider τ k ∈ Sym(V ). We denote by = (C) the subgroup of Sym(V ) generated by all the τ k 's. In literature, the following properties of are considered undesirable, since they could lead to weaknesses of C: small cardinality, imprimitivity and intransitivity. For a detailed discussion of their consequences see [19] . For a way to construct a trapdoor using the imprimitivity see [17] . We would add that should not be a subgroup of AGL(V ), otherwise it is obvious how to break the cipher. If turns out to be Alt(V ) or Sym(V ), these properties are automatically avoided. Note also that primitivity alone guarantees a non-negligible group size, but it could still be that would be weak (as for example if ≤ AGL(V )).
Unfortunately, the knowledge of (C) is out of reach for the most important ciphers (such as the AES, the SERPENT, the DES, the IDEA [10, 11] ). However, researchers have been able to compute another related group. Suppose that C is the composition of l rounds. 2 Then any key k would induce l permutations, τ k,1 , . . . , τ k,l , whose composition is τ k . For any round h, we can consider h (C) as the subgroup of Sym(V ) generated by the τ k,h 's (with k varying in K). We can thus define the group ∞ = ∞ (C) as the subgroup of Sym(V ) generated by all the h 's. We note the following elementary fact.
The group ∞ is traditionally called the group generated by the round functions. Note that independent sub-keys are implicitly assumed. We collect in the following proposition some previous results on ∞ .
The proof of any of the results in Proposition 2.4 requires an ad-hoc proof. Recently, a generalization of some of these results has been proposed [19] .
A class of block ciphers
Several definitions have been proposed for iterated block ciphers (see e.g., keyalternating block cipher in [5] , or Rjindael-like ciphers in [19] , or see [20] ). We would like to define a class, large enough to include most common ciphers, yet restricted enough to have simple criteria guaranteeing the primitivity of ∞ .
Let C be a block cipher with V = (F 2 ) n and n = ms, s ≥ 2. The vector space V is a direct sum
where each V i has the same dimension m (over F 2 ). For any v ∈ V , we will write
, is a bricklayer transformation and any γ i is a brick. When used in symmetric cryptography, maps γ i 's are traditionally called S-boxes and map γ is called a "parallel S-box".
A linear (or affine) map λ : V → V is traditionally called a "mixing layer" when used in composition with parallel maps.
In the following definitions we are not following established notation. We call any linear map λ ∈ GL(V ) a proper mixing layer if no sum of some of the V i (except { 0 } and V ) is invariant under λ. A similar definition can be given when λ ∈ AGL(V ).
We define our class (recall that σ v denotes a translation and that K can be different from V ) Definition 3. 1 We say that C is translation based (tb) if:
• it is the composition of a finite number of rounds, such that any round τ k,h can be written 3 as γ λσk, where -γ is a round-dependent bricklayer transformation (but it does not depend on k), -λ is a round-dependent linear map (but it does not depend on k), -k is in V and depends on both k and the round (k is called a "round key"), • for at least one round we have (at the same time) that λ is proper and that the map K → V, k →k, is surjective (a "proper" round).
Remark 3.2 A generalization is obtained by allowing a key-independent permutation at the beginning and/or another at the end. This is the case for example for the SERPENT cipher. Since these permutations have no influence on the cryptanalysis of a cipher, we implicitly ignore them.
Remark 3.3 A round consisting of only a translation is still acceptable, by assuming γ = λ = 1 V (the identity map on V ), although obviously it is not proper. Indeed, from now on we can always assume that the first round is of this kind, otherwise we can remove its γ and λ (Remark 3.2). Then, we can also assume that 0γ = 0, since we can add 0γ to the round key of the previous round (if the previous round is proper, it remains proper since σ 0γ is a permutation over V ).
Remark 3.4
To allow affine mixing layers, rather than linear mixing layers, seems a generalization. However, this case is indeed already present in our definition, since it is enough to change σ v to incorporate the "translation part" of the mixing layer.
Remark 3.5 A generalization can be obtained by only requiring at least one of the rounds to be of the prescribed form (with a proper mixing layer). Although our subsequent results still hold in this more general case, we do not know any interesting cipher of this kind.
The previous definition is similar to key-alternating block cipher (see Section 2.4.2 of [5] ), yet the latter is too general for our goals. Note that some famous ciphers, such as the DES cipher and the IDEA cipher, cannot be seen easily as tb ciphers and therefore our subsequent results do not have any obvious consequence for them.
From the knowledge of block systems of T (V ), we immediately obtain the following.
Fact 2 Let G = h (C) for any round h such that the map k →k is surjective. Then T = T (V ) ⊂ G. Therefore, if G acts imprimitively on M = V , the blocks of imprimitivity are the translates of a linear subspace.
Proof We show T ⊂ G. For anyk ∈ V , we have γ λσk ∈ G. By considering the zero key, we have also γ λσ 0 = γ λ ∈ G. Therefore, (γ λ) −1 γ λσk = σk ∈ G.
Corollary 3.6 Let G = h (C) for any round h. Then G acts imprimitively if and only
if there is a subspace U < V (U = {0}, V ) such that for any v ∈ V and u ∈ U , we have
In other words,γ
Proof G is imprimitive if and only if there is a block system of type {v + U }, for some subspace U, U = {0}, V . It is enough to consider a zero round key, so that
We provide a brief description of the AES [5] . It has several versions, depending on the key length, and even more versions are possessed by the original cipher Rijndael. We describe only the most popular version: AES-128 (the others are very similar, apart from the number of rounds and the key schedule). AES-128 is a tb cipher with 11 rounds. It acts on V = (F 2 ) 128 , where V is seen as a direct sum of 16 spaces V i , each of dimension 8, so that with our notation m = 8 and s = 16.
The first round is given only by the σk. The last round is γ AESλAES σk. All other rounds are called "typical" and are all identical: γ AES λ AES σk. The S-box γ AES is the same for both typical rounds and the last round. All bricks of γ AES are the same: any is defined as the composition of the patched inverse and an affine map x → Ox + t over F 2 , where O is a given m × m matrix and t is a given vector in (F 2 ) m . By Remark 3.3 we can ignore t and consider any brick as the composition of the patched inverse and the linear map x → Ox. As regards the mixing layer,λ AES is a linear map represented as a 16 × 16 matrix over F 2 8 , called "MixColumns" (see [5, 3.4.3] ), while λ AES is the composition of MixColumns and another linear map called "ShiftRows" (see [5, 3.4 .2]), again represented as a 16 × 16 matrix over F 2 8 . These names come from the following facts: any vector in V is seen as a 4 × 4 array with entries in F 2 8 [5, 3.4.2] ) and MixColumns on the first column shows that U contains four whole columns, and considering (if the state has more than four columns) once more the action of ShiftRows and MixColumns, one sees immediately that U = V .
Main results
We define for a vBf f two new notions of non-linearity. The first is weaker than δ-uniformity.
Definition 4.1 For any m ≥ 2 and δ ≥ 2, let A = (F 2 ) m and f ∈ Sym(A). We say that f is weakly δ-uniform if for any u ∈ A, u = 0, the size of image off u is at least
Fact 3 A δ-uniform map is weakly δ-uniform.
Proof Let B = Im(f u ). If f is δ-uniform, then |(f u ) −1 (b)| ≤ δ, for any b ∈ B. From A = b∈B (f u ) −1 (b), we have A = b∈B (f u ) −1 (b) ⇒ 2 m = |A| = b∈B |(f u ) −1 (b)| ≤ δ|B| which means |B| ≥ 2 m δ > 2 m−1 δ .
Remark 4.2 If a function f is weakly δ-uniform, with 2 r ≥ δ and the image Im(f u )
is contained in a subspace W , then the dimension of W is at least m − r . This is the property of f which will be needed in the proof of Theorem 4.4. Interestingly, if f is δ-uniform (as in Sect. 2.2), then the dimension of W which can be guaranteed is exactly the same (and not any bigger).
Our second notion focuses on the image of vector spaces.
Definition 4.3 Let
We say that f is strongly l-anti-invariant, if for any two subspaces U, W ≤ A,
In other words, l-anti-invariant means that the largest subspace invariant under f has codimension greater than l (except for A itself), while strongly l anti-invariant means that the largest subspace sent by f into another subspace has codimension greater than l (except for A itself).
We are ready for our main result (recall that 0γ = 0).
Theorem 4.4 Let C be a tb cipher, with h a proper round, G = h (C) and 1 ≤ r < m/2. If any brick of γ is:
(1) weakly 2 r -uniform and (2) strongly r -anti-invariant,
then G is primitive (and hence ∞ (C) is primitive).
Proof We suppose, by way of contradiction, that G is imprimitive. Let U be any proper subspace of V s.t. {v + U } v∈V form a block system for G. Since U is a block and γ λ ∈ G, we have
Let I be the set of all i such that π i (U ) = 0. Clearly, I = ∅. Then:
In the first case, U = ⊕ I V i , which means U γ = U . But (4.1) implies U λ = U , which is impossible since λ is a proper mixing layer.
In the second case, we denote W = U γ (equal to U λ −1 by (4.1)) and we note that
where γ = γ ι is the brick of γ in V ι . By Corollary 3.6, we have that
, this is impossible, since γ is strongly r -anti-invariant.
To apply our theorem to the AES cipher, we first need a simple lemma. Proof Let l ≥ 1 and let U, W be subspaces of codimension l such that U f = W . Let
and f is 2r -anti-invariant, l must be l > r , so U and W have codimension greater than r .
The first interesting consequence of our theorem is the following.
Corollary 4.6 Any typical round h of the AES cipher satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 4.4. As a consequence, both h (AES) and ∞ (AES) are primitive.
Proof Thanks to Lemma 3.7, we know that the mixing layer λ AES is proper. The patched inversion is well-known to satisfy (for any u = 0) Im(γ u ) = 2 7 − 1 > 2 6 and so it is weakly 2-uniform. Any brick γ of γ AES is the composition of the patched inversion and a linear map, so it is weakly 2-uniform as well (obviously, the composition with a linear map cannot change the weakly δ-uniformity of any vBf).
To apply the theorem we need only to show that γ is strongly 1-anti-invariant. 4 The l-anti-invariance cannot be changed by the composition with linear maps, so we need only to show that the patched inverse is strongly 1-anti-invariant. Let γ denote now the patched inverse. Since (γ ) 2 = 1, we want to apply Lemma 4.5 with r = 1. Indeed, γ is well-known to be 3-anti-invariant, since the only nonzero subspaces of F 2 8 which are invariant under inversion are the subfields (Theorem 2.2), and so the largest proper subfield is F 2 4 , of codimension 4 > 3.
The second interesting consequence is the following. Proof The conditions of Theorem 4.4 are satisfied with r = 1, as can be seen by a direct computer check on all Serpent S-boxes and on its mixing layer [18] .
The PRESENT cipher [9] can be easily seen as a tb cipher. We have not yet verified that it satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 4.4.
Further remarks
It may seem that Theorem 4.4 requires strong conditions on the mixing layer and on the S-boxes. We first show that the requirement on the mixing layer is necessary.
Proposition 5.1 Let C be a tb cipher, with λ a mixing layer for a round h. If λ is not proper, then G
It is obvious that W is a vector subspace of V . We claim that B = {W + v | v ∈ V } is a block system for G. Since clearly B is a block system for T , to prove our claim we need only to consider any W + v and then show that there are v 1 and v 2 such that
By linearity of λ, (W + v)λ = W λ + vλ = W + vλ, so the first equality is proved with v 1 = vλ. As regards the second equality, from the definition of W and the fact that γ is a bricklayer transformation, we have
. . , v s γ s ) and recalling that any γ i is a permutation over (F 2 ) m , we can conclude:
Now, we would like to discuss the conditions on the S-boxes (to avoid trivialities we assume here that m ≥ 2). A close examination of our proof of Theorem 4.4 shows the first logical implication of imprimitivity that matters: (4.1). This equation can be better analyzed if written as
In other words, the parallel map γ is sending a (proper) vector subspace into another. Since γ is a parallel map, this is possible only if any of its bricks do the same. Of course, any brick sends 0 and V i into themselves, but since U is a proper subspace, there must be a ι such that L ι γ is a subspace, with L ι a proper subspace of V ι . Our discussion has thus proved the following trivial result.
Proposition 5.2 Let C be a tb cipher, with h a proper round and G = h (C). If any brick of γ does not send any proper subspace into another subspace, then G is primitive.
The condition "does not send any proper subspace into another subspace" can be rephrased in our terminology as γ is (m − 1)-anti-invariant. This condition is indeed strong, but if we allow even only one γ to have an L ι , then we can construct a λ such that (4.1) is satisfied. We might add more conditions on λ to avoid this, but since we have identified a necessary condition ("proper mixing layer"), we feel that it is better to keep it and investigate instead further the conditions on γ . Equation (4.1) is implied by imprimitivity, but it is not equivalent to it. Even if (4.1) holds it can be that some affine space v +U is not sent into another by γ . By examining our proof more deeply, we see that imprimitivity is equivalent to having
with L ι = U ∩ V ι a proper subspace of V ι . "Primitivity" means that we find some conditions to avoid (5.1). The conditions in Theorem 4.4 force Im(γ u ) to be too large. The image Im(γ u ) always generates a subspace, no matter what conditions we put. By negating the two conditions we have that Im(γ u ) could fit inside W ∩ V ι . Since W depends on λ and we can choose any λ provided that it is proper, we feel that it is likely that a suitable λ can be found. In conclusion, we think that our hypotheses cannot be relaxed significantly, otherwise a block system may be built.
Remark 5.3
Actually γ sends 0 into 0 and so sends any set {0, x} into {0, xγ }, which means that γ sends any subspace of dimension 1 into another. But of course γ will fail, generally speaking, to send {v, v + x} into {vγ , vγ + x}.
Remark 5.4 Similar hypotheses to those of Theorem 4.4 guarantee that G is indeed the whole alternating group [4] .
